

A serious study of the Louvain group would surely have to take into account the relationships between Mercier's subordination of (the psychological state of ?) certitude to the natural tendency of the human intellect to unify its concepts and Van Steenberghen's relegating certitude to a secondary place in his theory of knowledge.

(4) Cf. Thonnard, op. cit., p. 940.

(5) Salvatoris Tongiori, Institutiones Philosophicae, Goemaere, Bruxellis, ed. 3a, 1864, Vol. I, Logica.

The title Institutiones Logicae for this first volume appears on p. 16.

(6) "Normae porro recte judicandi in duplici differentia sunt; aliae enim necessariae sunt ut rationis operationes rectae sint in se ipsis, aliae ut rationis cognitiones sint verae. Illae ab ipsa operationum intellectualium natura, istae ab objectis exsurgunt. Sic logicae tractatio in duas partes dispesci jam solet, quarum prima logica formalis, vel simpliciter Dialectica, altera logica materialis, seu melius Critica vocari potest. Logicam formalem Aristoteles omnium primus methodice tradidit, et scientiae dignitate donavit, eamque adeo perfecit, ut ei ulterius perficiendae vix aut ne vix quidem locum posteris reliquerit. Logica materialis recentioribus debetur, quanquam doctrinas quas in eam h'c digesserunt, veteres quoque magna ex parte traderent, sparsim tamen et in multis obiter; quia plenioram tractationem eorum temporum necessitates non postulabant. Vicissim recentiores multa ex his, de quibus in logica veteres disputabant, ad ontologiam rejecerunt." — Tongiori, op. cit., pp. 18-19. Cf. ibid., p. 239.

(7) Ibid., pp. 265-266, #417.

(8) Cf., for example: "Il est donc indispensable de distinguer entre la certitude du genre humain et la certitude philosophique, bien qu'à vrai dire on ne comprenne pas trop ce que pourrait valoir une certitude humaine en lutte avec la certitude du genre humain." — op. cit., p. 25.

Though Balmes seems to be more interested in emphasizing the point that reflection is in no sense the basis of our natural certitudes and that these have a perfectly legitimate existence entirely anterior to any reflection, and despite the fact that he talks a great deal of the obscurity of the knowledge we have of the causes of this natural certitude, it is still possible to point to such statements as this: ".... Mais rien de tel n'a lieu; donc, point d'actes réfléchis; ce qui prouve que l'enfant n'a que des perceptions accompagnées de la certitude intime de ces perceptions; tout cela d'une fa-

çon confuse, instinctive, sans rien qui rappelle ce que nous nommons réflexion philosophique." — ibid., p. 27.

- (9) Sullivan says that the theory of the three fundamental truths was originally set forth by Tongiorgi. As evidence of this, he says that Mercier attributes it to Tongiorgi and that the latter refers it to no other source. Cf. James B. Sullivan, First Principles in Thought and Being, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 1939, p.43.

Though Sullivan uses the third, rather than the eighth edition of Mercier's Critériologie and may, therefore, be correct with respect to what that edition says, in the eighth edition, p. 105, Mercier speaks explicitly of the theory of Bal-  
mes. He says that he will consider Tongiorgi's presentation of it for purposes of simplification, since Tongiorgi holds that the three truths are unitary, so that if one of them is denied the foundations of certitude are destroyed.

Oddly enough, Tongiorgi not only refers to Balmes for the theory, but leaves the impression that Balmes supports his position that all three truths must be taken together. Cf. op. cit., p. 271 and ft. nt. 1. This seems to contradict Mercier's statement directly. Tongiorgi would appear to be right here, since Balmes says: "...Tous trois sont nécessaires, chacun dans son espèce, et en son lieu. Nul d'entre eux n'est entièrement indépendant. En détruire un, c'est bouleverser l'intelligence." (op. cit., p. 214)

This is, however, a rather small point and it should not be taken to be a derogation of Sullivan's very excellent work, which is perhaps the best defense of the theory of the three primitive truths in English.

- (10) Op. cit., p. 276, #434.
- (11) Ibid., pp. 277-278, #436. In this connection it is interesting to notice that Balmes, despite his criticism of Descartes, refers to him as "l'illustre penseur" (op. cit., p. 111). If this is taken to be ironic, the same thing cannot be said of his spirited defense of Malebranche against Cousin's calling the latter "the Christian Spinoza" (cf. ibid., p. 308).
- (12) Dominicus Palmieri, S.J., Institutiones Philosophicae, Cuggiani, Santini, et Soc., Romae, 1874, Vol. I., Logica-Ontologia.
- (13) Op. cit., p. vi.
- (14) Ibid., pp. vii-viii. This is, of course, fundamentally the same division of material and formal logic as that which Tongiorgi gives. Cf. supra, ft. nt. 6. It is also the division

which is followed by almost all the modern Scholastics. For the correct division, cf. Bernard M. Flynn, "The Notion of Formal Logic" in Laval Théologique et Philosophique, Vol. II, Num. 1, 1946, pp. 181-183.

The sympathetic attitude toward the moderns seems to be a very important thing from the different references which are made to it by many of the modern Scholastics. It seems, indeed, to characterize what Thonnard calls the "Progressive Current". Thus: "Dans cette phase, nous n'assistons plus seulement à la restauration des anciennes doctrines thomistes, mais à un vigoureux effort pour assimiler tout ce que la pensée moderne a pu découvrir de bon; cet effort implique en conséquence, vis-à-vis des modernes une attitude plus bienveillante, toujours sévère pour l'erreur certes, mais insistant plus sur la part de vérité que possède tout grand système et ne craignant pas de reconnaître que le thomisme lui-même peut s'enrichir par ce moyen. Le chef de ce mouvement conquérant du néthomisme fut le Cardinal Mercier..." -- op. cit., p. 943.

Du Rousseau, on the other hand seems to be rather doubtful of this attitude: "Un dissentiment à ce point irréconciliable (that is, whether truth is the mutual coherence of our concepts, or the equilibrium between our thoughts and reality) n'est-il pas le signe que les solutions dogmatistes n'ont pas toute l'évidence dont elles se targuent, qu'elles ne sont pas adéquates aux difficultés, qu'elles préjugent certains points que le subjectivisme tient pour douteux; bref, que la manière d'aborder l'adversaire n'est assez prenante et décisive? Voilà ce qu'en dernier temps, certains scolastiques, et non des moindres, ont pensé. Aussi ont-ils cru sage de changer de tactique, d'entrer en contact plus intime avec le subjectivisme dans l'espoir de le réduire à merci en le battant sur son propre terrain.... Toutefois on peut dire sans exagérer, que la réforme a produit, parmi les tenants de la scolastique, un trouble fâcheux de langage et de pensées...." -- I. Du Rousseau, "Le Néo-Dogmatisme" in Revue Néo-Scholastique de Philosophie, Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, Louvain, 1911, p. 537.

(15) Op. cit., pp. viii-ix.

(16) Cf. ibid., p.1: ".....Logica est norma scientifica proposita dirigens mentem ad claram et certam notitiam rerum assequendam."

On p.2 of the same work, Palmieri lists the Categories, the Prior Analytics, the Posterior Analytics, the Perihermeneias, and the de Sophisticis Elenchis as the Aristotelian works which belong to Dialectics. It would appear to be such a division as

this that Zigliara excoriates. Then he says: "Dialecticam cum Sophistica confundere imperitissimum est...." — Cf. Thomas Maria Cardinalis Zigliara, O.P., Summa Philosophica, Beauchesne, Paris, ed. 14a, 1905, Vol. I., Logica et Ontologia, p. 6, #VII.

(17) Op. cit., p. 120-121.

(18) Ibid., p. 121.

(19) Palmieri holds that the division of certitudo into three species, metaphysical, physical, and moral is incorrect and that the correct division is absolute and hypothetical certitudo. Thus: "Nos autem hanc distinctionem ~~per~~ se non reiecit, sed negamus plures esse species certitudinis, atque unam statuimus: quae deficiente, concedimus quidem esse haberi eam, quae analogice dicitur certitudo, de qua in hac thesis locuti sumus; sed negamus aliam vera nomine esse certitudinem. Hanc porro unam certitudinem appellamus metaphysicam, quia ejusdem rationis est ac illa, quae vocari solet physica: dicimus vero eam metaphysicam, sive absolutam, et hypotheticam. Maxime videmus primo certitudinem absolutam et hypotheticam non duas esse differentes species, sed unam: secundum certitudinem physicam et moralem nullam haberi distinctam a metaphysica." — Op. cit., p. 152.

Pesch, for example, maintains both distinctions. He relates absolute and hypothetical certitudo to the exclusion of fear of error and says that it is found in real objective certitudo. The division into metaphysical, physical, and moral certitudo he refers to the motive of the intellectual assent. Cf. Filippus Pesch, S.I., Institutiones Logicales, Pars I, Summa Praeceptorum Logicae, Neumer, Friburgi Brisgoviae, 1888, pp. 573-574 and p. 570.

Absolute and hypothetical certitudo is directly related by these men to absolute and hypothetical necessity. It is, therefore, Suarezian in its origin. For a masterly critique of this concept of necessity, cf. Charles De Koninck, "Le Problème de l'Indéterminisme" in L'Académie Canadienne Saint-Thomas d'Aquin, 6<sup>e</sup> session, Oct. 1935, Typ. L'Action Catholique, Québec, 1937, pp. 65-159, esp. pp. 100 ff.

(20) Cf. Van Steenberghe, op. cit., p. 18, where he says of the date of the publication of Mercier's Critériologie: "....Parue en autographe dès 1834, imprimée pour la première fois en 1899, souvent rééditée depuis, la Critériologie du cardinal Mercier..."

- (21) Op. cit., p. 40.
- (22) Ibid., p. 106. Cf. also pp. 37; 40; 259; 430.
- (23) Ibid., p. 39. Cf. also p. 17.
- (24) Ibid., p. 40.
- (25) Ibid., p. 123. Cf. also pp. 106, 113.
- (26) Ibid., pp. 120-121. Cf. also pp. 111; 123-124. It should be noted here that, though Mercier speaks of a universal doubt in these passages, it is a doubt which concerns only the ability of the cognitive faculties to know the truth. This does not seem to be enough to justify saying that he holds a universal doubt unqualifiedly and it would seem that neglect of the distinctions Mercier makes has led to serious misunderstanding of his position. The consequence of this is, of course, a lack of precision in the critique directed against him and a failure to recognize the importance which the two Thomistic definitions of certitude have for his theory. Cf. infra, pp. 54 ff. for a discussion of these points and cf. J. de Tonquedec, La Critique de la Connaissance, Beauchesne, Paris, 1929, p. 441 ff. for an example of an excellent criticism of Mercier, which is, however, in some measure weakened by a disregard of these distinctions. De Tonquedec makes liberal use of the article of Du Roussaux referred to above (cf. ft. nt. 14 and Maritain quotes both of them (Cf. Jacques Maritain, Distinguer Pour Unir ou Les Degres Du Savoir, Desclée de Brouwer, Paris, 4e ed., 1946, pp. 145 ff. In the English trans. The Degrees of Knowledge, trans. by Bernard Wall, Scribners, New York, 1938, these references may be found on p. 89 ff.) so that the all three share this same basic defect.
- It should be understood, however, that the criticism of Mercier's theory of truth seems to be the principal concern of Du Roussaux and this aspect of his position has not been touched at all here, except for quotation below in ft. nt. (29) of Chap. I.
- (27) Op. cit., p. 115. R. Jeannière, S.J., Criteriologia vel Critica Cognitionis Certae, Beauchesne, Paris, 1912, p. 103 quotes this whole passage as an excellent resume of his thesis that: "Data problematis critici sunt ex una parte certitudines spontaneae, de quibus quaeritur num sint objectivae, et ex altera parte facultas quam habet homo in eas reflectendi." (ibid., p. 98).

- (28) The basis of this statement is the extent to which, as observed in ft. nt. (26), supra, both de Tonquedec and Maritain depend upon it.
- (29) Cf. supra, ft. nt.<sup>(14)</sup> for reference to Du Roussaux's article. It runs from pp. 537-563.
- (30) On p. 538, Du Roussaux raises five questions. The last, which he calls "the problem of the objectivity of knowledge", he treats under the first of the four main headings referred to here.
- (31) Art. cit., pp. 544-545.
- (32) Ibid., p. 557. Eodem loco, ft. nt. 1, he refers this to De Veritate, q.10. art.12, ad 7um and quotes the last part of it. That St. Thomas says here is: "Ad septimum dicendum, quod cogitari aliquid non esse, potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo ut haec duo simul in apprehensione cadant; et sic nihil prohibet quod quis cogitet se non esse, sicut cogitat se aliquando non fuisse. Sic autem non potest simul in apprehensione cadere aliquid esse totum et minus propria parte, quia unum eorum excludit alterum. Alio modo ita quod huic apprehensioni assensus adhibeatur; et sic nullus potest cogitare se non esse cum assensu: in hoc enim quod cogitat aliquid percipit se esse."
- It should be observed that this is another matter again than the universal negative doubt of the capacity of the faculties of knowledge to know the truth and that this is, therefore, another lack of precision in the criticism which is made of Mercier.
- (33) Art. cit., p. 558.
- (34) Ibid., p. 559.
- (35) L. Noel, "Le Thomisme et le Point de Vue Critique", in Revue de Philosophie, Rivière & Cie., Paris, Jan.-Fév., 1919, pp. 34-51.
- (36) Art. cit., p. 35.
- (37) The text from Descartes is the following: "Nihil utilius quaeri potest, quam quid sit humana cognitio et quousque extendatur. Ideoque nunc hoc ipsum unica quaestione complectimur, quam omnium primam per regulas jam ante traditas examinandam esse censemus; idque semel in vita ab unoquoque ex iis qui

tantillum amsnt veritatem, esse faciendum, quoniam ix illius investigatione vera instrumenta sciendi et tota methodus continentur. Nihil autem mihi videtur ineptius, quam de naturae arcanis, coelorum in haec inferiora virtute, rerum futurarum praedictione et similibus, ut multi faciunt, audacter disputare et ne quidem tamen unquam, utrum ad illa invenienda humana ratio sufficiat, quaesivisse. Neque res ardua aut difficilis videri debet, ejus quod in nobis ipsis sentimus ingenii limites definire, cum saepe de illis etiam, quae extra nos sunt et valde aliena, non dubitemus judicare. Neque immensus est opus, res omnes in hac universitate contentas cogitatione velle complecti, ut quomodo singulae mentis nostrae examini subjectae sint agnoscamus; nihil enim tam multiplex esse potest aut dispersum quod per illam, de qua egimus, enumerationem certis limitibus circumscribi atque in aliquot capita disponi non possit." Noel refers this passage to Descartes' Regulae ad directionem ingenii., ed. Adam et Tannery, T. X, p.398.

The following are the passages which he quotes from the Preface to the first edition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: "...It is, in fact, a call to reason, again to undertake the most laborious of all tasks -- that of self-examination, and to establish a tribunal, which may secure it in its well-grounded claims, while it pronounces against all baseless assumptions and pretensions, not in an arbitrary manner, but according to its own eternal and unchangeable laws. This tribunal is nothing less than the Critical Investigation of Pure Reason.... Metaphysics, as here represented, is the only science which admits of completion -- and with little labor, if it is united, in a short time; so that nothing will be left to future generations except the task of illustrating and applying it didactically. For this science is nothing more than the inventory of all that is given us by pure reason, systematically arranged. Nothing can escape our notice; for what reason produces from itself cannot lie concealed, but must be brought to the light by reason itself, so soon as we have discovered the common principle of the ideas we seek..." Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by J.M.D. Meiklejohn, Willey, New York, 1900, pp. xv and xix.

(38) Art. cit., p. 40.

(39) Ibid., p. 38.

(40) Ibid., pp. 40-41.

- (41) Ibid., pp. 41-44.
- (42) Ibid., pp. 44-45. The famous text is: "...aliae scientiae considerant particulariter de veritate: unde et particulariter ad eas pertinet circa singulas veritates dubitare: sed ista scientia sicut habet universalem considerationem de veritate ita etiam ad eam pertinet universalis dubitatio de veritate; et ideo non particulariter, sed simul universalem dubitationem prosequitur." -- In III Metaphys., lect. 1, #343.  
 When it is said that St. Thomas "following Aristotle", mentions universal doubt, this represents Noel's statement: "...Et lorsqu'on met en question, d'une façon radicale et universelle, la vérité, on atteint vraiment toute science par son fond. Saint Thomas le pensait et il l'a dit, à la suite d'Aristote..." (art. cit., p. 44). Cf. infra, pp. 62 ff. The reader should be careful to notice that, in this whole section, attributions are made to St. Thomas in the same way and should, therefore, be on his guard against accepting them as truly representing St. Thomas' position.
- (43) Ibid., p. 45.
- (44) Ibid., p. 47.
- (45) I Summa Contra Gent., c. 59, "Amplius....."; cf. infra, p. 139.
- (46) Art. cit., p. 47.
- (47) Ibid., pp. 50-51.
- (48) At the beginning of the chapter entitled "Le Réalisme Critique", supra. cit., ft. nt. 26, starting on p. 137. In the English edition, it is the second chapter, and begins on p. 86. Maritain here appears to hold a middle position. He is generally in favor of the Old Dogmatists, but he holds also that Thomism is a critical realism, against Gilson, who seems to say that it is a "naive" realism.
- (49) Op. cit., (supra, ft. nt. 3), pp. 17-18.
- (50) Ibid., pp. 19-20. Note also Van Steenberghen's statement on p. 7 of the same work: "...Parmi les penseurs contemporains dont nous nous sommes inspirés de préférence, il nous est agréable de citer M<sup>re</sup> L. Noël, notre ancien maître, dont les travaux seront souvent cités et utilisés."  
 The quotation from Balmes following this one from Van Steenberghen in the text is on p. 151, #246 of his Philosophie Fondamentale (cf. supra, ft. nt. 2).

## II. Chapter One:

- (1) The authority for this statement is L.-M. Regis, O.P., L'Opinion selon Aristote, Inst. D'Etudes Médiévales, Ottawa, 1935, p. 190. In ft. nt. 7, ibid., he says: "Il ne se trouve pas non plus chez Boèce ni chez Isidore; Du Cange, dans son Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis (ed. de 1738) nous donne bien l'abstrait certitas, mais non le terme certitudo. Forcellini, dans son Lexicon totius latinitatis (ed. 1858-1870) a les deux abstraits certitudo et certitas."

With the exception of these two references to Du Cange and Forcellini, all Regis' sources in this matter have been carefully checked here and the doing so reveals a more complete correspondence between Aristotle's use of ἀπρίβεια and William of Moerbeke's translation of it by "certitudo" than Regis' figures indicate. Cf. infra, p. 32 and ft. nt. 9. Nonetheless, the credit of suggesting this method belongs entirely to Regis, even though it does not seem at all possible to agree with him in the applications which he makes of it. He claims that the word had for Aristotle an entirely objective meaning and that with St. Thomas it took on a subjective reference, while with the moderns the objective bearing is entirely lost and only the subjective retained. The difficulty here seems to be in the meaning which is to be assigned to "subjective". He seems to take it to mean that the will is the subject of certitude in the proper sense. This opinion does not seem at all defensible (cf. infra, p. 125ff.). It could be sustained, if "subjective" were taken in a causal sense. The whole matter of applying the term "subjective" to knowledge is one which might well be examined fully. It should be noted that John of St. Thomas thus speaks of formal truth with constant reference to the object (cf. Cursus Theologicus, Tome II, disp. 22, art. 1-4, Vives, pp. 589-638), though he also distinguishes the intellectual virtues from the objective rationes formales sub qua and attaches them, as would be expected, to the intellect itself in Cursus Theologicus, Tome VII, disp. 1, art. 1, Vives, p. 6. II ff., among other places.

- (2) Regis, op. cit., is the authority for this date, though he refers to Ernout et Meillet, who do not seem to set any. Perhaps, however, he intends his reference for the first part of the paragraph.

Cf. A. Ernout et A. Meillet, Dictionnaire Etymologique de la Langue Latine, Lib. C. Klincksieck, Paris, 1932, pp. 172-173: "A la racine de cernō, se rattachent un certain nombre de formes en cer- ou en cre-:"

"certus .... Certus s'emploie au comparatif dans certiore facere.... de là le latin juridique a tiré certiorō, certōrātus. On trouve aussi dans la l. de L'Eglise certificō, ās, et les abstraits très tardifs certitūdō et certitās....

"Une racine de forme \*krei- 'separer', inconnue à l'indo-européen oriental, se trouve en grec, italique, celtique, et germanique.

"Elle sert à indiquer l'idée de 'cribler'. Toutefois ce sens n'existe pas dans les formes verbales grecques en grande partie influencées par le présent κρίνω (ion.-att. κρίνω, lesb. κρίνω), et n'apparaît guère dans les formes verbales latines: pres. cerno de \*crino."

- (3) Cf. supra, fn. nt. 2.
- (4) Cf. Emile Boisacq, Dictionnaire Etymologique de la Langue Grecque, 2e ed., Paris, 1923, p. 518 under κρίνω. Cf. Regis, op. cit., p. 186.
- (5) Ibid., pp. 38-39, under ἀκριβής. He says here: "ἀκριβής 'exact, soigneux; ἀκριβόω ἀκριβεύω faire exactement'..... examinant avec acuité par haplologie, et appartenant à la même base que κρίνω 'examiner, juger'..."
- (6) Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus (Prussian Academy), Berlin, 1870, pp. 27b43-28b8.
- (7) The assumption here made is that the translations are all Boerhaave's. In any case, the statement applies to the Latin versions of Aristotle which appear in the texts listed in the Bibliography.
- (8) Cf. In II Meta., #336: "...dicens quod 'acribologia' idest diligens et certa ratio, sicut est in mathematicis, non debet requiri in omnibus rebus, de quibus sunt scientiae..."
- (9) Cf. Regis, op. cit., p. 186: "....Sur trente-et-une confrontations qu'il nous a été donné de faire, 27 fois, les termes certus et ses dérivés certitudo, certitudinaliter sont les équivalents du grec ἀκριβής, ἀκριβέω, ἀκριβεύω. Il y a donc là pour le traducteur, et par conséquent pour les latins de son temps, une identité réelle de signification." A full list of the occurrences of the word in Aristotle can be found in the Appendix attached below, p. 219.
- (10) It has been thought worth while to include the Oxford English equivalents for the Greek ἀκριβής and they can be found in the Appendix mentioned in the note immediately above.

- (11) Op. cit., p. 189.
- (12) In III Sent., d. 23, q.2, art.2, s.3 (p. 723, #155).
- (13) In III Sent., d. 26, q.2, art.4 (p.842, #134).
- (14) It might be possible to see in Pesch, op. cit., p. 568, #476, an understanding of the first of these definitions as the material definition of certitude, while the second would be the formal definition. It is not clear, however, that this is what he means.
- (15) Op. cit., p. 420.
- (16) Ibid., p. 8; cf. also p. 16.
- (17) Cf. supra, p. 10.
- (18) Cf. supra, p. 12.
- (19) Cf. supra, pp. 10-12.
- (20) Ibid.
- (21) Op. cit., p.444. Cf. also ibid., pp. 445-446: "En effet, il ne faut pas identifier réfléchi et volontaire; il y a des réflexions spontanées, indélibérées: réfléchi s'oppose à direct et non à volontaire. La réflexion est le retour du sujet sur lui-même, sur son action personnelle, sur les oeuvres qu'il a accomplies. Les actes directs sont ceux qui s'appliquent à un objet distinct du connaissant. En outre, de ceux-ci même la conscience, c'est-à-dire la perception de soi, réflexion embryonnaire, n'est pas absent. En saisissant l'objet, je me sens moi-même en train de le saisir. Seulement, à ce stade, les deux éléments s'entre-pénètrent: le second, la conscience, ne se développe pas; il n'est pas l'objet principal de l'attention. Il est là néanmoins, au second plan, comme un accompagnement sourd de l'acte principal, qui est l'acte direct. Ensuite, une analyse très facile, très simple, toute naturelle, le dégagera nettement, le mettra à part: cela peut se faire de façon instantanée, dès le premier acte de conscience réfléchie. Ainsi, bien avant d'avoir conçu distinctement et formé volontairement le projet d'une critique générale de ses connaissances, l'homme possède déjà des certitudes réfléchies, contrôlées: une réflexion nouvelle serait, de tout point, pareille à la première, et n'y ajouterait rien d'essentiel."

- (22) Cf. In VI Metaphys., l. 4, #1236; In III De Anima, l. 8, 718; De Verit., q. 1, art. 9; q. 24, art. 2; In III Sent., d. 23, q. 1, art. 2.
- (23) T. I., disp. 2, art. 9 VII (VI p. 291b). Cf. also Curs. Phil., Log., II Pars, q. 23, art. 3 (pp. 741b-746b); Phil. Nat. IV Pars, q. 10, art. 4 (pp. 322b-332a) and art. 5 (pp. 333b-338a).
- (24) Cf. supra., p. 10.
- (25) Sullivan, however, makes this point very clear. Cf. infra, p. 43.
- (26) Op. cit., p. 90. Cf. supra, p. 11.
- (27) Ibid., pp. 112-113.
- (28) Ibid., pp. 115-116; cf. also p. 439.
- (29) It should be recognized, however, that this is not the only criticism he makes of the Exaggerated Dogmatists. He also charges them with a serious confusion of the real and ideal orders. Thus, in his criticism of the notion that the affirmation of the existence of the thinking subject is a primitive truth, he says: "L'affirmation de l'existence du sujet pensant est à la base des vérités d'ordre réel, mais la vérité des propositions d'ordre idéal est indépendante de l'existence des êtres contingents, indépendante de l'existence du moi aussi bien que celle du monde extérieur; par conséquent l'affirmation de l'existence du moi n'est pas une vérité fondamentale, 'primitive' au sens absolu du mot, c'est-à-dire en ce sens qu'elle serait un des fondements nécessaires de toute certitude." -- ibid., pp. 106-107. Cf. also: "L'aptitude à connaître la vérité est une des conditions réelles, ressortissant à l'ordre ontologique, de la science certaine. La chose s'entend d'elle-même. Pour qu'un effet se produise, il faut que sa cause existe. L'effet, ici, c'est la connaissance certaine de la vérité.... Mais le savant professeur du collège Romain transporte dans l'ordre logique ce qui n'est accordé que pour l'ordre ontologique." -- ibid., pp. 111-112.
- On this point, Du Roussaux says: "Le néo-dogmatisme a défiguré cette formule (, i.e., adaequatio rei et intellectus) au point de la rendre méconnaissable.
- "Trouvant qu'elle ne pouvait servir en critique, à cause qu'elle implique l'ordre réel lequel est le point en litige avec le subjectivisme, on l'a interprétée et appropriée de manière à la rendre acceptable même aux adversaires. A cet

effet, on en retranche -- provisoirement -- le réel (res), qui d'ailleurs ne rentre pas, d'après leur vue, dans l'horizon intuitif de l'intelligence puisque celle-ci, comme ils disent, ne juge pas directement de la chose en soi.

"En substituant à la chose en soi la chose en idée, on aurait pu obtenir la définition suivante: la vérité objective est la conformité de la chose mentale (triangle) avec le concept (trilatéral), tandis que la vérité logique aurait été la conformité du jugement avec la chose (triangle en idée). Tout cela eut été acceptable comme notion de la vérité dans l'ordre purement abstrait. Seulement, le réel en idée était encore trop, puisqu'il préjuge la cognoscibilité de la chose en soi. Il a donc fallu l'éliminer aussi et dire: la vérité objective est la conformité de l'objet mental avec ses predicates; la vérité logique, la conformité de l'énonciation avec l'unité de l'objet mental. Cette fois tout vestige du réel a bel et bien disparu." -- art. cit., pp. 546-547.

It will be clear to the reader that these quotations are adduced here primarily to warn him that the criticism which Mercier makes of the Old Dogmatists is not limited to what he says about their assuming the ability of the cognitive faculties to know the truth and, therefore, to place this criticism of Mercier in its proper perspective. There is, of course, no intention of engaging here in an examination of Mercier's theory of truth.

- (30) Op. cit., pp. 45-46. The way he himself gets around this difficulty is well expressed in the following passage: "Hence while one should not dismiss the objections of the skeptics without a hearing (and even the so-called 'exaggerated dogmatists' do not do this, as Coffey admits), one is nevertheless bound willy-nilly to admit -- even at the outset of all epistemological investigation -- that the cognitive faculties can obtain objective truth. But is not this a petitio principii, presupposing the main thesis which epistemology is to demonstrate, at least indirectly? No; for the purpose of epistemology cannot be to answer the question 'Can I know?' If I do not know at the start whether I can, nothing epistemology has to say can convince me. Its purpose is to show why and how I can know; in showing this it goes over the cognitive processes and their motives by reflection and examination, and confirms the spontaneous knowledge already acquired...." -- ibid., p. 47. Cf. supra, pp. 3 and 5 to see the conformity between this attitude and that of Tongiori and Palmieri.

- (31) Cf. supra, p. 38 and ff.

- (32) Cf. supra, pp. 11-12.
- (33) Op. cit., pp. 80; 106-426.
- (34) Ibid., p. 436.
- (35) Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits, Allen and Unwin, London, 1948.
- (36) Ibid., p. 527. (*Italics ours.*)
- (37) Emile Meyerson, Identité et Réalité, Alcan, Paris, 1932, p. xiv.
- (38) Cf. John Dewey, Logic, The Theory of Inquiry, Henri Holt, New York, 1938, p. 11. Cf. ibid., p. 16.
- (39) Ibid., p. iii.
- (40) Ibid., p. 21. Cf. also his attack on "Intellectus Purus", p. 10; pp. 20-21.
- (41) This does not by any means indicate a conscious borrowing. Dewey is very explicit in indicating his dependence upon C. S. Peirce: cf. op. cit., pp. iii; iv; ft. nt. 1, p. 9. Jeannière, op. cit., p. 273, calls Peirce the father of Pragmatism.
- (42) In this sense, it would appear that there is a great deal more philosophical insight in the French writers than in Dewey. The reference is to J. de Tonquedec, La Notion de Vérité dans la "Philosophie Nouvelle". Beauchesne, Paris, 1908, p. 15. This book is a handy little summary of the main points of the differences between the Scholastic position and that of the "New Philosophy" in the matter of truth, which is, according to Le Roy, the main point of their disagreement.
- (43) This statement is in no sense in contradiction with the argument given below (cf. p. 104 ff.), which intends to show that there is a real doubt implicit in Mercier's theory. What is intended here is simply to indicate the consequences of what Mercier's actual formulas mean. Thus, on the one hand, he appears to recede from the sceptical position entirely, so that his does not seem to have any special advantage over any other theory, though he believes it does; and, on the other, it is completely sceptical, or at least seems to be so.
- (44) Cf. supra, p. 9 ff.

- (45) Cf. In I Phys., Læct. 10, #5: "....Quod quidem licet vere ponerent, non tamen quasi ab aliqua ratione moti hoc ponebant, sed sicut ab ipsa veritate coacti...."
- (46) Du Roussaux, as already noted, has pointed out the care which must be taken to avoid being deceived by the new sense given to old words by Mercier and others of his school.
- (47) Cf.: "Ante inquisitionem criticam, non est praesupponenda tanquam justificata ea certitudo quam homines naturaliter habent de aptitudine suae mentis ad objecta cognoscenda (I); dubitatio autem universalis, non positiva quidem sed negativa, tanquam methodus recte adhibetur (II)." -- op. cit., p. 103. This is one of his theses. In connection with the proof of the second part of it, he says: "Dubitatio debet esse: I. Realis. Nam a) relate ad objectivitatem certitudinis nequit homo in duas personas dividi, quarum una objectivitatem inquirat dum altera eam pro certa teneat....b) adsunt motiva non spernenda certitudines examini critico subjiçendi, sc. errores et contradictiones hominum, etc." -- ibid., p. 113 and cf. ft. nt. (1), same page. Cf. also: "Le doute critique est universel. Il remet en question l'objectivité de toutes les certitudes sans exception. De plus il est réel. Ce n'est pas un essai loyal mais irréalisable, une tentative consciencieuse mais nécessairement avortée, comme s'expriment quelques auteurs. Non, je fais plus qu'essayer, je mets effectivement en question toutes les certitudes que j'ai conscience de posséder; et j'entends bien ne faire grâce à aucune. Il faudra que quelque chose survienne pour me faire sortir du doute universel. C'est donc que j'y aurais été." -- ibid., p. 118. For de Tonquedec's criticism of this, cf. La Critique de la Connaissance, p. 442ff.
- (48) Cf. op. cit., pp. 68-72, where he explains the difference between real and methodical doubt, and pp. 72-73, where he defends the methodical doubt as necessary for scientific progress. Note especially: "....Or, l'esprit du philosophe, qui ne doute que par méthode, n'est pas réellement dans le doute. Mais si le doute appelé méthodique n'est pas un doute réel de l'esprit, il y a donc bel et bien opposition entre le doute réel et le doute méthodique." -- ibid., ft. nt., p. 72.
- (49) Cf. supra, ft. nts. (47) and (48); also (43).
- (50) Cf. supra, p. 13.
- (51) Cf. op. cit., p. 39 ff.

- (52) He first states it on p. 40 (Cf. supra, p. 11, first quotation).
- (53) Op. cit., p. 115.
- (54) Ibid., p. 115.
- (55) Ibid., pp. 115-116.
- (56) Ibid., pp. 116-119.
- (57) Ibid., pp. 119-123.
- (58) Cf. supra, p. 42.
- (59) Op. cit., p. 70.
- (60) Ibid., pp. 116-117.
- (61) Ibid., pp. 118-119.
- (62) Ibid., p. 119.
- (63) Ibid., p. 120. It is interesting to notice here his appeal to the principle of contradiction, even though he does not establish its validity until a good deal later: "....il s'en suivrait que les termes extrêmes d'une proposition seraient d'une complexité infinie: personne ne soutiendrait une erreur aussi manifeste." He also makes reference to the Post. Anal. and to the commentaries of St. Thomas and Cajetan in support of this point.
- (64) Op. cit., p. 120.
- (65) Cf. supra, p. 12.
- (66) Cf. op. cit., p. 120 and supra, ft. nt. (64).
- (67) Op. cit., pp. 7 and 35. It is notable that he does not even mention suspicion in either place.
- (68) Cf. supra, p. 49.
- (69) In I De Anima, lect. 8, #111. Cf. also: "....si oportet de aliqua parte animae dicere quid est, scilicet quid est intellectivum, aut sensitivum, aut vegetativum, prius oportet dicere de actibus, scilicet quid sit intelligere, et quid sentire. Et hoc ideo, quia secundum rationem definitivam, actus et operationes sunt priores potentiis. Potentia enim, secundum hoc ipsum quod est, importat habitudinem quandam ad actum: est enim principium quoddam agendi vel patiendi...." — In II De Anima, lect. 6, #304.

- (70) Op. cit., p. 121; cf. supra, p. 12.
- (71) Cf. P. Coffey, Epistemology, or the Theory of Knowledge, Peter Smith, New York, 1938, Vol. I, p. 104.
- (72) Ibid., pp. 106-107.
- (73) Art. cit., p. 44.
- (74) Op. cit., p. 114. Cf. Van Steenberghen's statement: "La méthode critique ou la méthode du doute est d'un usage constant dans la scolastique. Elle se concrétise notamment dans la célèbre méthode du 'sic et non', opposition du 'pour' et du 'contre', par laquelle les penseurs du moyen âge inaugurent toutes leurs discussions et presque tous leurs exposés. Dans son Commentaire sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote, saint Thomas expose le rôle du doute ou de la critique comme préambule de la science et il requiert au seuil de la science de l'être une 'universalis dubitatio de veritate'." — op. cit., p. 53. Van Steenberghen speaks of the doubting all the affirmations of common sense or the spontaneous convictions of consciousness as constituting the critical method in epistemology, and he does so in the paragraph next following the one just quoted but one. Nonetheless his reference to St. Thomas here does not tie in the doubt of all spontaneous convictions with it, at least explicitly, and certainly not so directly as does Jeannière. Coffey is somewhat more explicit than Van Steenberghen, though not quite so explicit as Jeannière: "Aristotle recommends this method of procedure at the commencement of the Third Book of his Metaphysics. In order to reach a definite solution of any question, he says, we should commence by doubting, by inquiring into all the difficulties involved in it, the ἀπορίαι, the pros and cons of the question. And not only does he use this procedure in regard to particular truths in the special sciences. He also recommends us to use it in regard to truth in general when we are concerned, as we are in philosophy, with truth in general." — op. cit., p. 102.
- (75) Op. cit., p. 437.
- (76) Meta., B (III) 995a24-995b4.
- (77) In III Meta., lect. 1, #343.

- (78) Cf. La Critique, etc., p. 439. Cf. Zigliara: "Aliud enim est dubium movere circa aliquam peculiarem veritatem, ut Scholastici faciunt, aliud circa omnes simul et circa fontes ipsos unde nobis cognitiones proveniunt: una enim veritate dubie suscepta, aliae praesto sunt ad ipsam tuendam; sed si omnes funditus et simul evertantur, quo fundamento niti potest mens ad suscitandum aedificium scientificum?" — op. cit., p. 201.
- (79) De Tonquedec, La Critique, etc., p. 440.
- (80) Cf. op. cit., p. 51.
- (81) Ibid., ft. nt., 67, p. 51.
- (82) The quotation is from In III Meta., lect. 1, #342. It is here given exactly as Sullivan quotes it. For the whole text, cf. infra, p. 71.
- (83) Op. cit., p. 201. This quotation is in direct continuity with the one given above in ft. nt. (73).
- (84) Cf. supra, ft. nt. (75).
- (85) In III Meta., lect. 1, #342.
- (86) Cf. supra, pp. 65-66.
- (87) Meta., B (III), 995b3-4.
- (88) In I Phys., lect. 1, #4.
- (89) In I Ethic., lect. 3, ##38 and 40.
- (90) Op. cit., p. 113.
- (91) Ibid., p. 4, #3.
- (92) Cf. Le cardinal D. J. Mercier, Logique, Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, Louvain, 7e ed., 1922, p. 31: "En résumé, l'esprit part de l'observation de la réalité. La Physique générale est leur complément philosophique. La Physique est représentée aujourd'hui par la Cosmologie, par la Psychologie, par la Théodicée. A la Psychologie se rattachent la Critériologie et les thèses fondamentales de l'Éthique ou science des mœurs."
- (93) For his general attitude toward certitude, cf. supra, p. 2.

- (94) Op. cit., p. 18.
- (95) Ibid., p. 20.
- (96) Ibid., pp. 23-24; 50; 220.
- (97) Ibid., p. 25.
- (98) Ibid., p. 15.
- (99) Ibid., pp. 220-221.
- (100) "Potest etiam et alia esse ratio; quia dubitabilia, quae tangit, sunt principaliter illa, de quibus philosophi aliter opinati sunt. Non autem eodem ordine ipse procedit ad inquisitionem veritatis, sicut et alii philosophi. Ipse enim incipit a sensibilibus et manifestis, et procedit ad separata, ut patet infra in septimo. Alii vero intelligibilia et abstracta voluerunt sensibilibus applicare. Unde, quia non eodem ordine determinaturus, quo ordine processerunt alii philosophi, ex quorum opinionibus dubitationes sequuntur; ideo praelegit primo ponere dubitationes omnes seorsum, et postea suo ordine dubitationes determinare." -- In III Meta., lect. 1, #344.
- (101) Cf., for example, In I Phys., lect. 1, #6ff.
- (102) Cf. supra, ft. nt. (100).
- (103) Cf. supra, ft. nt. (100).
- (104) In III Meta., lect. 1, #338.
- (105) In II Meta., lect. 1, #273.
- (106) "....Primo proponit intentum, dicens, quod 'theoria', idest consideratio vel speculatio de veritate quodammodo est facilis, et quodammodo difficilis." -- In II Meta., lect. 1, #274.
- (107) Meta., q. (II), 993b2.
- (108) In II Meta., lect. 1, #275.
- (109) Cf. supra., p. 20ff.

- (110) In addition to the works quoted above, cf., for example Julien Peghaire, C.S.SP., Regards sur le Connaitre, Fides, Montréal, 1942 for a rather popular explanation.
- (111) "A moins de commettre une pétition de principe, nous ne pouvions donc poser l'existence du monde extérieur, y rattacher la réalité objective des prédicats de nos jugements, tant que nous n'avions pas assuré la valeur objective universelle des principes idéaux, en particulier celle du principe de causalité" — Crit., p. 418.
- (112) "L'épistémologie doit comporter avant tout une analyse des données immédiates de la conscience, une description des éléments constitutifs de la conscience (épistémologie analytique ou descriptive). Sur la base de cette description, on pourra tenter une critique de la connaissance, visant à établir la nature et les possibilités du savoir humain (épistémologie critique). Cette analyse et cette critique posent l'objet d'une troisième discipline, qui s'applique à déterminer les lois générales de l'activité discursive de l'esprit (épistémologie logique)...." — op. cit., p. 50. Chapter Two of his work, pp. 51-142, is occupied with analytical or descriptive epistemology and Chapter Three, pp. 143-196, is given over to critical epistemology.
- (113) Meta., a (II), 993ba-7.
- (114) In II Meta., lect. 1, #277. Cf. In IV Meta., lect. 6, #598 and #605.
- (115) In II Meta., lect. 1, #282.
- (116) Cf. supra, p. 77. Cf. also, In II Meta., #285.
- (117) In II Meta., lect. 1, #232.
- (118) In II Meta., lect. 1, #235.
- (119) "Dicendum est ergo, quod sensus impeditur a cognitione alicujus sensibilis dupliciter. Uno modo per corruptionem organi ab excellenti sensibili; et hoc locum non habet in intellectu. Alio modo ex defectu proportionis ipsius virtutis sensitivae ad objectum. Potentiae enim animae non sunt ejusdem virtutis in omnibus animalibus; sed sicuti homini hoc in sua specie convenit, quod habeat pessimum olefactum, ita nyctioraci, quod habeat debilem visum, quia non habet proportionem ad claritatem diei cognoscendam" — In II Meta., #284.

- (120) Meta., (II) 993b8-12.
- (121) It is not clear from the text that this is a different argument, though it seems to be.
- (122) Compendium Theologiae, I, c. 25, (ed. Mandonnet, T.II, pp. 48-49).
- (123) "....Non enim necessarium est, quod quicquid aliquis dicit, haec mente suscipiat vel opinetur." — In IV Meta., lect. 6, #601.
- (124) "....Non igitur contingit aliquem circa haec interius mentiri et quod opinetur simul idem esse et non esse" — In IV Meta., lect. 6, #603.
- (125) Cf. supra, p. 44ff.
- (126) In IV Meta., lect. 6, #597.
- (127) In IV Meta., lect. 6, #593.
- (128) Cf. Critériologie, pp. 109-110; 443-445.
- (129) Cf. supra, p. 38.
- (130) In one place, Mercier speaks of certitude as the material object of criteriologie: "Nous nous en tiendrons au mot Critériologie, et, subsidiairement, à la désignation imprécise Traité de la certitude; désignation imprécise, en effet, car elle n'indique que l'objet matériel de la Critériologie." — Critériologie, p. 2. In another, he calls criteriologie the science of certitude: "La Critériologie étant la science de la certitude...." — ibid., p. 5.
- (131) In VI Meta., lect. 1, #1151; cf. ibid., Lib. IX, lect. 7, #2250 and In I Poster., lect. 2, #3ff.
- (132) This seems to be a characteristic of all the writers of the Louvain school, practically without exception.
- (133) Cf. supra, ft. nt. (48) of Chap. I.
- (134) Cf. Critériologie, pp. 73-74.
- (135) Ibid., p. 71.

- (136) Cf. supra, pp. 53-54.
- (137) Cf. quotation, supra, p. 12.
- (138) Eodem loco.
- (139) Cf. Critériologie, p. 40; Logique, p. 83.
- (140) La Critique de la Connaissance, pp. 445-446.
- (141) Critériologie, p. 73.
- (142) Ibid., p. 72.
- (143) Cf. ibid., p. 71 for description of real doubt as lacking determined adhesion and p. 70 for explanation of real doubt as not dependent upon the will.

III. Chapter Two:

- (1) Cf. supra, p. 35.
- (2) Cf. supra, p. 61ff.
- (3) In III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, qa. 3 (p. 732, #132).
- (4) In III Sent., d. 26, q. 2, art. 4 (p. 840, #129).
- (5) Cf. IIa IIae, q. 18, art. 1.
- (6) In III Sent., d. 26, q. 2, art. 4, corp. (p. 842, #134).
- (7) ".....Responsio. Dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod spes non habet aliam certitudinem nisi a fide; sed in hoc differunt quod certitudo fidei est in universali, sicut quod quilibet bonus habebit vitam aeternam; certitudo autem spei est in particulari, sicut quod iste, si bene facit, habebit vitam aeternam. Et ideo certitudo fidei est universalis et absoluta, certitudo autem spei particularis est et conditionata.  
 "Sed hoc non potest stare; quia universale et particulare non diversificant essentiam neque habitum. Unde secundum hoc spes a fide non differet secundum habitum, neque in alia potentia esset: quod omnino est falsum.  
 "Et ideo aliter est dicendum quod certitudo proprie dicitur firmitas adhaesionis virtutis cognitivae in sum cognoscibile...." ibid., (pp. 841-842, ## 133-134).
- (8) Cf. supra, p. 37.
- (9) "Determinatur autem intellectus ad unum tripliciter....In fide vero ex hoc quod voluntas intellectui imperat." -- In III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, art. 2, sol. 3 (p. 728, #155).
- (10) In III Sent., d. 26, q. 2, art. 4, ad 1 (p. 842, #138).
- (11) IIa IIae, q. 18, art. 4.
- (12) Op. cit., p. 193.
- (13) Ibid.
- (14) In III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, art. 3, qa. 1: "Videtur quod fides sit in voluntate sicut in subjecto." (p. 729, #162).

- (15) "Quia vero non tenderet determinate in finem suum nisi ab aliqua cognitione praecedente in ipsam ordinaretur, inde est quod opus naturae est simile operi artis, inquantum per determinata media tendit in suum finem. Et hoc habet ex determinatione divinae Sapientiae instituentis naturam." -- In III Sent., d. 26, q. 2, art. 4, corp. (p. 842, #134). Cf. also:  
 "Ad novum dicendum, quod virtus dicitur esse certior omni arte, certitudine inclinationis ad unum, non autem certitudine cognitionis; virtus enim, ut dicit Tullius (lib. II de Inventiones), inclinatur ad unum per modum cujusdam naturae; natura autem certius et directius pertingit ad unum finem quam ars; et per hunc modum dicitur quod virtus est certior arte, non ut certius aliquis in se percipiat virtutem, quam artem." -- De Verit., q. 10, art. 10, ad 9.
- (16) ".....Unde patet quod natura nihil est aliud quam ratio cuiusdam artis, scilicet divinae, indita reus, qua ipsae res moventur ad finem determinatum...." -- In II Phys., lect. 14, #8.
- (17) De Ente et Essentia, c. 1, ca. fin. In Laurent's edition of Cajetan's Commentary, it appears on p. 29a.
- (18) De Verit., q. 6, art. 3.
- (19) Cf. Henri Pichette, "Considérations sur quelques principes fondamentaux de la doctrine du spéculatif et du pratique" in Laval Théologique et Philosophique, Editions de l'Université Laval, Québec, Vol. I, 1945, Num. 1, pp. 52-70, esp. pp. 58-63.
- (20) Ia, q. 16, art. 1, ad 3.
- (21) Cf., for example: "....causae autem dicuntur ex quibus aliqua dependent secundum suum esse vel fieri; unde etiam quae sunt extra rem, vel quae sunt in re ex quibus non componitur res primo, possunt dici cause, non tamen elementa." -- In I Phys., lect. 1, 5, and: "Sciendum est autem, quod principium et causa licet sint idem subjecto, differunt tamen ratione. Nam hoc nomen Principium ordinem quandam importat; hoc vero nomen Causa, importat influxum quandam ad esse causati...." -- In V Meta., lect. 1, #751.
- (22) Cf. De Verit., q. 1, art. 2; Ia, q. 16, art. 1; "..... Et hoc ideo, quia esse rei est causa verae existimationis quam mens habet de re. Verum enim et falsum non est in rebus, sed in mente...." -- In II Meta., lect. 2, #298.

- (23) Cf. De Verit., q. 3, art. 6; Ia, q. 37, art. 3; Curs. Theol. T. II, disp. 22, art. 1, #2.
- (24) "Dico secundo: Si attendamus ad fundamentum seu firmitatem veritatis, et condiciones ejus, potest admittere latitudinem, et principalius seu perfectius potest inveniri in uno, quam in alio. Et aliquae condiciones ex istis principalius inveniuntur in intellectu, aliae principalius in rebus; et juxta hoc sententiae relatae conciliantur inter se, et ex omnibus illis resultat resolutio. Haec conclusio constabit, enumerando istas condiciones seu respectus, et formalitates veritatis. Et primo, considerari potest ratio firmitatis, seu immutabilitatis et certitudinis...." -- Curs. Theol., T. II, disp. 22, art. 2, #61.
- (25) "Respondetur, quod quando veritas dicitur magna perfectio intellectus, aut etiam ultia, non debet sumi pro sola relatione adaequationis, sed pro ejus fundamento, et pro certitudine atque evidentia qua attingitur veritas....Veritas autem cum dicitur esse tam magna perfectio, non sumitur pro sola relatione adaequationis, sed pro ipsa cum suo fundamento manifestationis ut conformabilis rebus in se." -- ibid., #23.
- (26) "Ipsa autem certitudo formalis, id est, ut certificans nos, seu ut asserta et manifestata in nobis, primario et per se invenitur in intellectu....Quarta condicio primo et per se invenitur in intellectu: quia veritas, ut manifestans se nobis et certificans nos, non est nisi intra intellectum, ubi est manifestatio et apprehensio seu assertio veritatis; et talis veritas dicitur formalis, formalitates scilicet manifestationis et certitudinis. Et secundum hanc rationem veritas sic sumpta non invenitur in rebus, nisi denominative et analogice..." -- ibid., #62.
- Cf. also: "Respondeo dicendum, quod in illis quae dicuntur per prius et posterius de multis, non semper oportet quod id quod per prius recipit praedicationem communis, sit ut causa aliorum, sed illud in quo primo ratio illius communis completa invenitur; sicut sanum per prius dicitur de animali, in quo primo perfecta ratio sanitatis invenitur, quamvis medicina dicatur sana ut effectiva sanitatis. Et ideo, cum verum dicatur de pluribus per prius et posterius, oportet quod de illo per prius dicatur in quo invenitur perfecta ratio veritatis...." -- De Verit., q. 1, art. 2; cf. De Verit., q. 2, art. 11.

- (27) Cf. In I Meta., lect. 1, ## 6-8.
- (28) Cf. In I Poster., lect. 1, #4.
- (29) It would, indeed, be possible to indicate several authors, in addition to Mercier and Pesch, who mention both definitions. But there does not appear to one of them who gives any explanation of why the second is the definition to be preferred. There are, of course, a great many who do not give the first.
- (30) Cf. supra, p. 130.
- (31) In III Sent., d. 26, q. 2, art. 4, ad 2 (p. 342, #139).
- (32) Cf. supra, p. 134.
- (33) In III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, art. 2, sol. 1 (p. 725, #138).
- (34) In VI Ethic., lect. 3, #1145; cf. ibid., lect. 5, #1175.
- (35) "Eternal" in the sense that they are not subject to variation, but are immutable and necessary. Cf. In II Meta., lect. 5, #336 for immobility as cause of certitude.
- (36) Cf. supra, p. 129.
- (37) ".....Intellectus autem conformitatem sui ad rem intelligibilem cognoscere potest; sed tamen non apprehendit eam, secundum quod cognoscit de aliquo quod quid est. Sed quando iudicat rem ita se habere sicut est forma quam de re apprehendit, tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum. Et hoc facit componendo et dividendo...." -- Ia, q. 16, art. 2.
- (38) "Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut verum per prius invenitur in intellectu quam in rebus, ita etiam per prius invenitur in actu intellectus componentis et dividensis quam in actu intellectus quidditates rerum formantis. Veri enim ratio consistit in adaequatione rei et intellectus; idem autem non adaequatur sibi ipsi, sed aequalitas diversorum est; unde ibi primo invenitur ratio veritatis in intellectu ubi primo intellectus incipit aliquid proprium habere quod res extra animam non habet, sed aliquid ei correspondens, inter quae adaequatio attendi potest. Intellectus autem formans quidditates, non habet nisi similitudinem rei existentis extra animam, sicut et sensus in quantum accipit speciem rei sensibilis; sed quando incipit iudicare de re apprehensa, tunc ipsum iudicium intellectus est quoddam proprium ei, quod non invenitur extra in re....." -- De Verit., q. 1, art. 3.

- (39) Cf. Ia, q. 16, art. 1.
- (40) Ia, q. 16, art. 2.
- (41) De Verit., q. 1, art. 11.
- (42) Ibid.
- (43) Cf. supra, p. 20.
- (44) I Contra Gent., c. 59, "Amplius.....".
- (45) Cf. supra, p. 138.
- (46) Cf. De Verit., q. 1, art. 9.
- (47) Cf. In II De Anima, lect. 13, #385; De Verit., q. 1, art. 11.
- (48) De Verit., q. 1, art. 9.
- (49) Ibid.
- (50) Cf. In II De Anima, lect. 13, #384.
- (51) Cf. In III De Anima, lect. 11, ##746, 761-763; In IX Meta., lect. 11, ##1901-1909.
- (52) In III Sent., d. 26, q. 2, art. 4, ad 2 (p. 842, #139).
- (53) Cf. supra, p. 130.
- (54) Cf. Curs. Theol., disp. 22, art. 1, #2 and art. 2.
- (55) De Verit., q. 1, art. 2.
- (56) ".....Motus autem cognitivae virtutis terminatur ad animam: oportet enim ut cognitum sit in cognoscente per modum cognoscentis...." -- ibid. "....Veritas igitur potest esse in sensu vel in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est, ut in quadam re vera, non autem ut cognitum in cognoscente: quod importat nomen veri...." -- Ia, q. 16, art. 2.
- (57) ".....sola autem et nuda relatio veritatis non est ipsa perfectio intellectus, sed quid consecutum ad ipsam. Et hujus manifestum signum est: quia veritas et falsitas, pro sola relatione, fortuito et casualiter possunt convenire iudicio, et mutari ipso etiam ignorante et non advertente: ut si quis for-

"nec hoc iudicium 'Petrus loquitur', et ipso nesciente cessat loqui, veritas mutatur in falsitatem; et sic in reliquis contingentibus, quia etiam sine propria advertentia potest objectum mutari, et tamen actus, qui antea erat, continuari; et hoc ipso desinit esse verus; ergo hoc praecise non est magna perfectio, si sumatur solum pro relatione adaequationis vel inadaequationis." -- Curs. Theol., T. II, disp. 22, art. 2, #28.

- (58) Ia, q. 16, art. 2.
- (59) In VI Meta., lect. 4, #1234.
- (60) De Verit., q. 1, art. 1; cf. In I Sent., d. 29, q. 5, art. 1 (p. 486ff).
- (61) Cf. supra, p. 126.
- (62) Cf. infra, p. 151.
- (63) Cf. supra, p. 139ff. The text which indicates that truth can be said to be properly in the sense is: ".....unde et in sensu proprie veritas et falsitas dicitur secundum hoc quod iudicat de sensibilibus; sed secundum hoc quod sensibile apprehendit, non est ibi veritas et falsitas proprie..." -- De Verit., q. 1, art. 11.
- (64) Cf. Ia IIae, q. 51, art. 1.
- (65) Curs. Theol., T. VI, disp. 16, art. 2, #5.
- (66) In III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, art. 2 (p. 725, #138).
- (67) Cf. supra, p. 135.
- (68) Cf. supra, pp. 126-127.
- (69) In III De Anima, lect. 6, #661.
- (70) Ia, q. 85, art. 6; cf. also De Verit., q. 1, art. 11.
- (71) In II De Anima, lect. 12, #374; cf. ibid., #373.
- (72) Cf. Ia IIae, q. 57, art. 5, ad 3.
- (73) In III Sent., d. 27, q. 1, art. 2 (p. 862, #43).

(74) Quaest. Disp. De Anima, art. 13, ad 11.

(75) Cf. Pierre Rousselot, "Amour Spirituel et Synthèse Aperceptive", in Revue de Philosophie, Rivière, Paris, Vol. XVI, pp. 225-240; and "L'Être et L'Esprit", Ibid., pp. 561-574.

"....L'amour n'aveugle qu'en donnant de nouveaux yeux. Il ne fait pas juger à faux d'objets vus d'abord dans une lumière limpide; il colore la lumière ou l'atmosphère même dans laquelle on voit des objets. Il fait extraire, comme naturellement, un nouveau terme de connaissance. Je dirais, en terme scolastique, qu'il suscite une nouvelle faculté d'abstraire et prescrit au sujet connaissant un nouvel objet formel. Et cette contestation d'une perversion accidentelle de la connaissance permet de mieux comprendre ce que c'est que 'faculté d'abstraire' et ce que c'est qu' 'objet formel'." — Amour Spirituel, etc., p. 226.

Whatever there is of real value in the ideas of Rousselot would seem to have been long since anticipated by John of St. Thomas: "Quare ascendit est, quod amor, et intellectus potest duplicem considerationem habere. Primo ut applicat ea, et alias potentias ad operandum, et sic solum se habet effective, et executive in ordine ad illas operationes, scilicet per modum applicantis ad agendum: secundo, ut applicat sibi objectum, et illud unit, et inviscerat sibi per quandam fructificationem, et quasi connaturalitatem, et proportionem cum tali objecto, et quasi experitur illud experientia affectiva, juxta illud Psal. xiiii: Gustata, et vidata. Et sic affectus transit in conditionem objecti, quatenus ex tali experientia affectiva redditur objectum magis conformae, et proportionatum et unitum personae, aique magis conveniens, et sic fertur intellectus in illud, ut expertum, et contractum sibi, et hoc modo se habet amor ut praecise movens in genere causae objectivae, quatenus per tale experimentum diversimode proportionatur, et conveniens redditur objectum." — Curs. Theol., T. VI, disp. 18, art. 4, ¶11.

One should also read Quaest. Disp. De Virtutibus in Senectute, art. 6, for the part which prudence plays in the proportioning of the individual will to the individual good.

Rousselot's concept, which depends entirely upon the natural determination of the will appears, in the light of such texts as the ones mentioned, extremely simplicist, to say nothing of the errors which it involves.

(76) In III De Anima, lect. 4, #630.

(77) De Verit., q. 2, art. 9; cf. Ia, q. 84, art. 2.

- (73) De Verit., q. 2, art. 2.
- (79) Curs. Theol., T. II, disp. 16, art. 1, #10, Cf. also De Verit., q. 2, art. 2 and Ia, q. 84, art. 2.
- (80) Cf. Ia, q. 89, art. 1 for the explanation of the necessity of sense knowledge as based upon the fact that otherwise human knowledge would be extremely confused.
- (81) ".....De ratione autem hujus naturae est quod in aliquo individuo existat, quod non est absque materia corporali; sicut de ratione naturae lapidis est quod sit in hoc lapide; et de ratione naturae equi est quod sit in hoc equo, et sic de aliis, Unde natura lapidis, vel cujuscunque materialis rei, cognosci non potest complete et vere, nisi secundum quod cognoscatur in particulari existens...." — Ia, q. 84, art. 7.
- (82) ".....Intellectus autem humanus modo se habet; non enim est actus alicujus organi; sed tamen est quaedam virtus animae, quae est forma corporis.....Et ideo proprium ejus est cognoscere formam in materia quidem corporali individualiter existentem, non tamen prout est in tali materia...." — Ia, q. 85, art. 1.
- (83) ".....Intellectus autem humani, qui est conjunctus corpori, proprium objectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens...." — Ia, q. 84, art. 7.
- (84) ".....In rebus autem sensibilibus multum est de natura infiniti sive indeterminati, quia in eis est materia, quae quantum est de se non determinatur ad unum, sed est in potentia ad multas formas; et est in eis natura entis similiter ut diximus, videlicet quod esse rerum sensibilibus non est determinatum, sed ad diversa se habens. Unde non est mirum si non determinatum cognitionem ingerit sensibus, sed huic sic, et alteri aliter." — In IV Meta., lect. 12, #681.

This should not, however, cause one to lose sight of the fact that certain and determined knowledge even of material things can be attained by the intellect. Cf., for example: "Unde cum res cognoscantur per suam formam magis quam per materiam, non est dicendum quod non possit haberi de rebus aliqua determinata cognitio...." — ibid., #682 and "..... Et quavis concedatur eis quod motus secundum quantitatem sit continuus in rebus, et quod omnia hoc motu insensibiliter moveantur, tamen secundum qualitatem vel formam non oportet quod propter hoc semper omnia moveantur. Et ita poterit haberi cognitio de rebus determinata; quia res magis cognoscuntur per suam speciem quam per suam quantitatem." — In IV Meta., lect. 13, #688. Cf. In VI Ethic., lect. 1, #1123; Ia, q. 86, art. 3.

- (85) Cf. In VII Meta., lect. 10, #1493; Ia, q. 85, art. 1, ad 2.
- (86) Cf. In VII Meta., lect. 10, #1496.
- (87) Cf. In II Meta., lect. 5, #336 for relation between immobility and certitude. Though the relationship is there made explicitly for immaterial beings, it would seem to be perfectly capable of general application. In fact, the way in which the reason for the certitude of immaterial beings is stated by St. Thomas has the appearance of being a particular instance of a universal principle: "Immaterialia vero secundum seipsa sunt certissima, quia sunt immobilia."
- (88) ".....Cognitio enim mentis humanae fertur ad res naturales primo secundum formam, et secundario ad materiam prout habet habitudinem ad formam. Sicut autem omnis forma, quantum est de se, est universalis, ita habitudo ad formam non facit cognoscere materiam nisi cognitione universali....Sicut anima forma universalis ducit in cognitionem materiae universalis..." — De Verit., q. 10, art. 6.
- (89) Cf. Bernard I. Mully, C.S.C., Thomism and Mathematical Physics, Laval University Doctoral Dissertation, 1943, pp. 67ff.
- (90) The exception for Palmieri has already been noted in ft. nt. (19) of the Introduction.
- (91) "D'autres fois encore, on découvre chez certains penseurs des préoccupations qu'on pourrait appeler esthétiques: au moyen âge, par exemple, les classifications des sciences s'inspirent volontiers de la dignité de leurs objets respectifs, ou du degré de certitude qu'elles atteignent...." — op. cit., p. 11. This statement occurs in connection with his explanation of the different principles upon which have been based different philosophical systems. Perhaps it is incorrect to say that this notion that certitude is an aesthetic principle betrays unfamiliarity with the Aristotelian and Thomistic texts. It would seem to indicate rather a misconception of the nature of certitude itself.
- (92) Cf. In I Poster., lect. 10, #4.
- (93) Ibid.,
- (94) Cf. De Verit., q. 10, art. 6, ad 2.

- (95) "dictum est enim superius in septimo et in octavo, quod in substantiis simplicibus idem est res et quod quid est ejus. Sic igitur cum substantia simplex sit ipsum quod quid est, idem judicium est de cognitione substantiae simplicis, et de cognitione ejus quod quid est..." — In IX Meta., lect. 11, #1907. It is, of course, the lack of composition in simple substances which obviates the possibility of error with regard to them and which even eliminates the possibility of accidental deception as arising from composed essences. Cf. ibid., ##1908-9.
- (96) Cf. In VII Meta., lect. 11, #1535.
- (97) "..... Unde in rebus compositis est considerare duplicem actum, et duplicem potentiam. Nam primo quidem materia est ut potentia respectu formae, et forma est actus ejus; et iterum natura constituta ex materia et forma, est ut potentia respectu ipsius esse, in quantum est susceptiva ejus...." — Quaes. Disp. De Spirituibus Creaturis, art. 1.
- (98) In 'De Ente et Essentia', c. vi, q. 15.
- (99) Cf. In, q. 85, art. 5.
- (100) In I Poster., lect. 10, #8.
- (101) In I Poster., lect. 2, #3.
- (102) The certitude of the practical intellect is not, of course, demonstrative certitude, and it cannot, because of the matter with which it is engaged, be infallible. This is, however, no reason for neglecting the probable certitude which can be had in practical knowledge: ".....In actibus enim humanis, super quibus constituuntur judicia, et exiguntur testimonia, non potest haberi certitudo demonstrativa, eo quod sunt circa contingentia et variabilia; et ideo sufficit probabilis certitudo, quae ut in pluribus veritatem attingat, etsi in paucioribus a veritate deficiat.....Nec tamen quia non potest in talibus infallibilis certitudo haberi, debet negligi certitudo quae probabiliter haberi potest...." — IIa IIae, q. 70, art. 2 and ad 1.
- (103) Cf. supra, p. 153.

- (104) Cf. In VI Ethic., lect. 1, #1123.
- (105) In VI Ethic., lect. 3, #1152.
- (106) In II Meta., lect. 2, #293.
- (107) In Ia IIae, q. 57, art. 5, #3.
- (108) The good, in the case of art, is of course, the good of the thing. For the close relationship between the good and the beautiful, cf. St. Thomas' Expositio Super Dionysium, De Divinis, Nominibus, c. iv, lect. 5 to lect. 9. For an example of the close connection there can be between the beautiful and the end for which the object is designed, or the use to which it is put, cf.: "...neque iterum est (Deus) pulcher quantum ad unum et non quantum ad aliud, sicut contingit in omnibus quae sunt ordinata ad unum determinatum usum vel finem (si enim applicentur ad aliud, non servabitur consonantia, unde nec pulchritudo)..." — ibid., lect. 5. There is never any such question in speculative science as such.
- (109) In III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, art. 2, sol. 1 (pp. 724-725, #139).
- (110) De Verit., q. 11, art. 1.
- (111) Cf. 1st quotation, supra, p. 161.
- (112) Cf. Ila IIae, q. 4, art. 8.
- (113) "Normally", in order to take care of the case in which the habit of science is generated in a single act, Cf. Curs. Theol., T. VI, disp. 13, art. 8.
- (114) Curs. Theol., T. VI, disp. 16, art. 1, which is devoted to some general principles about the distinction of the intellectual virtues and to the habit of first principles.
- (115) "Primo ergo supponendum est, quod tam in intellectu, quam in voluntate virtutes, quae in illis sunt conveniunt in hoc quod debent perficere illas potentias non quomodocumque, sed in ordine ad operationem perfectam, et consummatam, quia de sua essentiali ratione virtus est perfecta qualitas mentis, et est ultimum potentiae. Unde non dicitur aliquis virtuose agere penes opera imperfecta, et defectuosa, sed penes perfecta et bona in eo genere in quo operatur...." — ibid., #1.
- (116) ".....Sed tamen differt modus perficiendi in utraque virtute intellectus, et voluntatis quod virtus intellectus, cum versatur circa verum cognoscendum perfectio ejus consistit in certitudine, quia tunc perfecte cognoscit, et judicat intellectus

"cum cognoscat firmiter, et certe, ita quod illa cognitio perficere non potest, tunc enim perfecto excludit suum oppositum, et contrarium quod est falsum, in quo consistit defectus intellectus..." — ibid.

- (117) "Secundo notandum est, virtutes perficientes partem speculativam, non esse solum species intelligibiles, superadditas intellectui, quae solum representativae sunt, et vicariae ob-  
jectorum, quorum vice potentiam informant. Habitus autem intellectivi non sunt qualitates representantes, ac loco ob-  
jecti substitutae, sed sunt qualitates dantes intellectui  
facilitatem, seu facultatem utendi illis speciebus ordinate  
ad cognoscendum, et manifestandum veritatem. Unde vocantur  
lumen intellectus, non quidem lumen quo objectum ipsum redia-  
tur illuminatum, et proportionatum cognosci, sed quo poten-  
tia ipsa actuatur, et perficitur ad determinatum objectum  
cognoscendum..." — ibid., #6. Cf. ibid., #8 for necessity  
of acquisition of habits.
- (118) Ibid., #11.
- (119) Ibid., #14.
- (120) Ibid., #16; cf. also T. VI, disp. 13, art. 2, #20.
- (121) Commentaria in Praedicationes Aristotelis, ed. Laurent, Ange-  
licum, Romae, 1939, pp. 2-3.
- (122) Cf. Ia IIae, q. 57, art. 2.
- (123) Cf. Curs. Theol., T. VI, disp. 16, art. 2. The most important  
of the places to which he refers in Aristotle for the foundation  
of this opinion is Poster. Anal., Bk. II, 99b15-100b15.
- (124) Cf. Curs., p. 149.
- (125) ".....quia inductio est consequentia, et discursus non neces-  
sarius, neque efficax, sed fallibilis....At vero veritas  
primorum principiorum est per se nota, et assentitur illi in-  
tellectus majori certitudine, et evidentia quam conclusioni  
demonstratae..." — Curs. Theol., T. VI, disp. 16, art. 2. #7.
- (126) ".....et est manifestum, quia inductio parat viam ad cognos-  
cendum universale ut universale est, si quidem ex enumeratio-  
ne singularium colligit illud. Non potest autem numerare om-  
nia singularia; ergo non potest ex illa enumeratione suffici-  
enter et plene colligere universale....et (intellectus) as-  
sentitur illi tanquam propositioni universali, ut cum dicit  
omne totum est majus sua parte: quodlibet est, vel non est;  
ergo oportet quod in assensu talis propositionis universalis  
sit certior intellectus, quam ex inductione praecise certi-  
ficari potest. Quare cum Aristoteles prima principia ex in-

"Inductione generari dicit, non sumit inductionem pro ratione formali assensus principiorum neque per modum consequentias, et argumenti, quo illa principia certificentur nobis cum primum principium definiatur ab Aristotele I posteriorum, XX: Quod sit propositio medium vacans, id est medio probativo; nec enim accipit suam certitudinem per probationem, sed ex terminis ipsis redditur nota. Inductio ergo dicitur ab Aristotele esse id ex quo generatur notitia principiorum quantum ad aliquam modum, seu conditionem requisitam, scilicet ut accipiantur modo universali, quia in nostro intellectu universale accipitur ex singularibus prius cognitis per sensum. Unde pro ea parte qua notitia principiorum supponit species acceptas ex sensibus, etiam ut universaliter id sumat, presupponit plurimum singularium notitiam in sensibus acceptam, et ex talibus singularibus posse intellectum formare conceptum, et notitiam rei universalis...." — Ibid.

(127) Ibid., #7 and 13.

(128) "Unde licet quoad modum cognoscendi, et ferendi concessum universalis praesupponatur aliquorum singularium notitia, aut numeratio, quia universalis abstrahitur a multis, et est una in multis, tamen ratio formalis cognoscendi hanc veritatem est necessaria illa, et immediata connexio terminorum, quae hoc ipso quod apparet, et constat esse necessariam, etiam manifestatur esse universalem, quia quod necessarium est, omnibus convenit, et semper. Quare quod inductio facere non potest scilicet omnia singularia percurrere, et ex illis inferre per necessariam consequentiam universale, supplet ipsa notitia terminorum, quae necessariam connexionem invenit inter illos; talis enim necessaria connexio universalitatem firmat." — ibid., #11.

(129) Cf. In I Poster., lect. 7, esp. #7 #8.

(130) Cf.: "....In inductione autem concluditur universale ex singularibus, quae sunt manifesta ad sensum." — In I Poster., lect. 1, #11.

(131) Cf.: ".... Quia igitur universalium cognitionem accipimus ex singularibus, concludit manifestum esse quod necesse est prima universalis principia cognoscere per inductionem. Sic enim, scilicet per viam inductionis, sensus facit universale intus in anima in quantum considerantur omnia singularia." — In II Poster., lect. 20, #14.

- (132) "Fundamentum huius ex eo sumitur, quia omnia principia sive communia, et notissima, sive particulare pro diversis scientiis conveniunt in una ratione formali cognoscendi; ergo non possunt diversos specie habitus constituere....Ratio autem formalis cognoscendi sumitur ex medio, seu motivo. Ubi ergo omnes propositiones vacant medio, vacant diverso modo, et solum conveniunt in unica ratione, nempe ut per se ipsa, et ex terminis dicantur nota. Et licet tradantur ista principia circa diversa objecta, quae diversam habent immaterialitatem, et intelligibilitatem, tamen hoc ipso quod ex terminis, et sine alio medio sunt nota, eandem difficultatem vincendam habent, nec unam alio diversam evidentiam specie distinctam facit, quia per se, et ex terminis sunt evidentia, et nota, et solum erit differentia materialiter, et praesupposita, eo quod termini facilius, aut difficilius, magis vel minus communiter explicantur. Constat autem, quod habitus distinguuntur specie penes diversas rationes formales ordinatas ad vincendum diversas difficultates: sic enim indigeant diverso lumine, et habitibus." — Curs. Theol., I. VI, disp. 1a, art. 2. #27.
- (133) Ibid., "30.
- (134) ".....visio, proprie loquendo, est actus sensus visus.  
 "Sed propter nobilitatem istius sensus translatum est nomen visionis ad actus aliarum potentialium cognoscitivarum secundum similitudinem ad sensum visus.  
 "Potest ergo attendi similitudo quantum ad genus cognitionis tantum. Et sic large modo et improprie omnis cognitio visio dicetur...." — In III Sent., d. 24, art. 2. sol. 1 (p. 768, ## 46-47).
- (135) ".....Illa autem videri dicuntur quae per seipsa movent intellectum nostrum vel sensum ad sui cognitionem...." — Ila IIae, q. 1, art. 4.
- (136) Cf. In III Sent., d. 24, art. 2, sol. 4 (p. 768, ##46-50).  
 Perhaps it should be noted that St. Thomas himself also uses the term "evidence". Thus: "Id secundum dicendum quod scientia et intellectus habent certitudinem per id quod ad cognitionem pertinet, scilicet evidentiam ejus cui assentitur...." — In III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, art. 3, sol. 1, ad 2 (p. 732, #173).
- (137) Cf. Curs. Phil., Log., II Pars. q. 26, art. 4 (p. 804a44-b22). This article is a concise commentary on the two Thomistic definitions of certitude. Though it refers only to the first definition directly, it also includes a reference to the second in that it defines certitude in terms of both determination and adhesion of the intellect to one thing: "Certitudo...

"non est aliud quam determinatio seu adhesio intellectus ad unum." (p. 303b20-24). On the basis of St. Thomas' treatment of the first definition, John of St. Thomas here divides certitude into caused, or formal certitude, which is ex parte actus and "causing" certitude. The latter he subdivides, according to whether the cause is ex parte obiecti or ex parte subjecti. The second member of this division refers, of course, to the determination of the intellect which is caused by the will when the object itself is incapable of determining it.

- (138) Cf. Curs. Phil., Log., II Pars. q. 26, art. 5, (pp. 303b43-304a5), also p. 312a27-36.
- (139) "....qualibet propositio, cuius praedicatum est in ratione subjecti, est immediata et per se nota, quantum est in se." — In I Poster., lect. 5 #7. "Ad hoc autem quod aliquid sit per se notum, nihil aliud requiritur nisi ut praedicatum sit de ratione subjecti....." — De Verit., q. 10, art. 12.
- (140) "Ad hoc autem quod sit per se notum, oportet quod nobis sit cognita ratio subjecti in qua concluditur praedicatum... — ibid. Cf. also In I Poster., lect. 5, #6-3 for divisions of immediate principle, especially: "Quaedam vero propositiones sunt immediatae, quarum termini non sunt apud omnes noti. Unde, licet praedicatum sit de ratione subjecti, tamen quia definitio subjecti non est omnibus nota, non est necessarium quod tales propositiones ab omnibus concedantur."
- (141) In III Sent., d. 14, art. 2, sol. 1 (pp. 445-446).
- (142) ".....Per haec autem nullo modo potest elevari ad cognoscendum quidditates immaterialium substantiarum, quae sunt inproportionatae istis substantiis sensibilibus. Unde impossibile est quod anima humana hujusmodi corpori unita, apprehendat substantias separatas cognoscendo de eis quod quid est." — In II Meta., lect. 1, #285.
- (143) Cf. II Summa Contra Gent., c. 98: "Intellectus autem noster, quia inimum gradum tenet in substantiis intellectualibus, adeo particulatas similitudines requirit quod unicuique cognoscibili proprio oportet respondere propriam similitudinem in ipso; unde per similitudinem animalis non cognoscit rationale, et per consequens nec hominem, nisi secundum quid."
- (144) Cf. Ia, q. 89, art. 1, ca. fin.
- (145) Compend. Theol., I, c. 105.
- (146) Cf. Curs. Phil., Log., II Pars. q. 27, art. 1 (esp. p. 823a 14-32).

The reader should be apprized of the fact that, from a philosophical point of view, the following chart is of scarcely any value. It is essentially nothing more than a footnote on a rather minor point. It may be of some help in understanding the consistency with which Moerbeke translates the various forms of *ἐκπιβεα* by "certitudo", or its variants. At the same time, it indicates the regularity with which these same words underlie the English translation.

The list is based on Bonitz' Index Aristotelicus, which does not pretend to give a complete listing of all the occurrences of these words in Aristotle, but only to show their different usages. Thus, "Bo" means that the case instanced is derived from Bonitz' list alone. In some few places, incidentally to other work, these references have been checked with other sources. Where that has happened, the additional text has been marked by "Be", for Bekker's text; by "La", for the text in the Loeb Classical Library; and by "Ro", for Ross' edition of the text of the Physics.

The Oxford English translations have been used for the most part, and this is indicated by "Ox". When, for reason which there is no need of explaining here, the translation in the Loeb Classical Library has been used, "La" makes that fact clear.

Finally, the columns titled "Used of" intend to show of what the word itself is predicated or in what connection it is used. This varies from text to translation in many cases, so that the designations are arbitrary in a high degree.

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